Search engine companies collect the "database of intentions", the histories of their users' search queries. These search logs are a gold mine for researchers. Search engine companies, however, are wary of publishing search logs in order not to disclose sensitive information.
Introduction
Civilization is the progress toward a society of privacy. The savage's whole existence is public, ruled by the laws of his tribe. Civilization is the process of setting man free from men. -Ayn Rand.
My favorite thing about the Internet is that you get to go into the private world of real creeps without having to smell them. -Penn Jillette.
It is hard to imagine the Internet today without the easy access to Internet Search Engines that help us to find pieces of information on the Web. Whenever a user submits a search query, the search engine logs the query and other information associated with it (for example, what links the user clicked on). The content of these search logs enable much valuable research within search engine companies to improve both search experience and search performance as exemplified in the following two applications:
• Search Performance: Index caching [2] is designed to reduce query response time by keeping parts of the inverted index in main memory while putting the rest in lower levels of the storage hierarchy (such as SSD or hard disks). The placement is computed based on access frequencies of keywords in the search log.
• Search Quality: Query Substitution [10] studies how to rephrase a user query to match it to documents or advertisements that do not contain the actual keywords of the query but contain relevant information. Algorithms for query substitution examine the subsequent query pairs in the search log to learn how users sequentially rephrase queries.
We expect that publishing search logs will boost the research on search quality and efficiency. Currently, this research is almost exclusively conducted at search engine companies. For example, in the last three years only a single paper was published at WWW that conducted search log analysis but did not have an author working for a search engine company. All other 15 papers on search log analysis can be linked to search engines through the list of authors. We expect this to change once all researchers have access to search logs. The reason why search engines are reluctant to publish their search logs is that they are concerned with user privacy disclosure.
In this paper, we investigate the problem of disclosure control when publishing search logs [1, 12, 16] . By disclosure control, we mean that although we publish (a modified) search log, an attacker will not be able to infer sensitive information about individuals whose search data is contained in the published log. We seek algorithms generating sanitized search logs that limit the disclosure of sensitive information. Prior events show that this is a hard problem. AOL published three months of search logs of 650,000 users where the only privacy protection was the replacement of user-ids with random numbers. However, the queries of a user usually contain identifying information such as searches for addresses and local events or even for the user's name. This information can be linked to external databases to re-identify the user. The log that has been suitably termed the "database of intentions" then unravels the life and personality of the user through her searches for diseases, habits, lifestyle choices, personal tastes, and political affiliations. For example, the New York Times identified Ms. Thelma Arnold from Lilburn, Georgia as searcher number 4417749 [3] in the AOL search log; her queries contained not only enough information to identify herself, but also showed her love for dogs and her friends' medical ailments. This data has now made the rounds on the Internet resulting in Internet web sites that serve the data such as aolpsycho.com, as well as blog comments such as "Last week, AOL did another stupid thing, but at least it was in the name of science." 1 More attacks have been proposed showing that the removal of names, age, zip codes and other identifiers does not prevent re-identification of the authors of queries [9] . Replacing keywords in search queries by random numbers is also not sufficient to guarantee privacy [13] .
As a response, several algorithms based on kanonymity have been proposed for sanitizing search logs [1, 16] . Conceptually, these algorithms guarantee that an entry in the published search log can only be linked to at least k other users. However, unfortunately these privacy definitions are too weak in practice. As we will discuss in Section 6, queries in a search log is different from generic set-valued attributes since adversaries can actively influence the search log by submitting queries themselves, and thus weak privacy definitions that are based only on anonymity leak too much private information.
Our Contributions. In this paper, we describe a novel way of publishing search logs that guards against very powerful adversaries, and we perform a thorough study of the utility of our published search logs in comparison with the original search logs. In particular, this paper makes the following contributions:
Strong Privacy Guarantees. Our work enforces (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy [15] : We guarantee that an attacker learns roughly the same about a user whether or not the user's search history was part of the published data. Providing very strong privacy guarantees is important for search logs, since attackers can manipulate the search log themselves by submitting search queries. Prior work fails to guard against such active attackers and thus provides insufficient privacy guarantees.
An Efficient Algorithm for Publishing Search Logs. We develop a novel algorithm called ZEALOUS 2 that enables us to publish search logs while enforcing (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy. ZEALOUS can gracefully handle the huge domain and the sparsity of the data while preserving frequent keywords, queries and clicks.
A Thorough Study of Utility With Real Applications. We evaluate the utility of ZEALOUS and compare it to related work. Instead of only comparing summary statistics between the original and published log, we take a novel, application-oriented approach to utility: We implement the two search log applications described in the first paragraph, run these applications on the original and the published sanitized search log, and compare the results using application-specific metrics. Our evaluation shows that the search log produced using ZEALOUS retains good utility despite its much stronger privacy guarantees compared to previous work.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
We continue in Section 2 with some background on search logs and a discussion of the shortcomings of prior work on sanitizing search logs. Section 3 describes ZEALOUS and the analysis of its privacy guarantee. Section 4 gives an in-depth analysis of choosing parameters for ZEALOUS, and Section 5 experimentally evaluates ZEALOUS against prior work.
We give an overview of previous work in Section 6, and conclude in Section 7.
Preliminaries
In this section, we will give a brief introduction on search logs and data privacy, providing the reader with the necessary terminology and background for Section 3 where we describe ZEALOUS.
Search Logs
Search engines such as Microsoft Live Search, Google, Yahoo, AskJeeves, or others enable users to ask keyword queries and return a ranked list of relevant websites. Users then click on one or more of these links. Search engines have sophisticated ways to identify users; for example, users may be logged on to accounts provided by the search engine, or they might be identified via cookies and IP address. A search log is a collection of search log entries that contain data about the users' queries and the links that they clicked on. We assume that a search log entry has the following schema:
user-id, query, time, clicks , where a user-id identifies a user, a query is a set of keywords, and clicks is a list of url, pos pairs, indicating that the user clicked on the given link (url ) which was displayed at rank (pos) to the user. A user history consists of all search entries from a single user. Such a history is usually partitioned into sessions containing queries with similar user intent; many details go into this partitioning that are orthogonal to all the techniques in this paper. Query pairs are two subsequent queries from the same user that are contained in the same session.
Search engines compute histograms, or counts of keywords, queries, etc., from the search log, and use these instead of the actual log for a variety of applications. The algorithm we propose in the next section publishes noisy histograms rather than the whole search log. We define the keyword histogram of a search log SL as a set of pairs (k, c k ). Here k is a keyword and c k is the number of users in whose search history in SL contains that keyword. We define the query histogram, the query pair histogram, and the click histogram analogously.
Privacy
When thinking about privacy in search logs, we have to answer the following questions: (1) What information in the search log is sensitive? (2) What attackers do we consider? (3) What privacy guarantee should we give?
Sensitive Information. Due to the very sensitive content in search logs, we take a very conservative approach toward privacy: We consider all information in a search log to be sensitive. It is not only sensitive what query or keyword a user asked, it is also sensitive on what documents the user clicked.
Power of Attacker. We want to guarantee privacy against the largest possible class of attackers. An attacker can actively add data to the search log (simply by submitting queries to the search engine) and then she can use any external source of information to analyze the published search log. In particular, we want to protect privacy against active attacks, linking attacks, and the homogeneity attack without making any assumptions about the attacker's background knowledge.
Privacy Guarantee. We want to guarantee that an attacker learns roughly the same information about a user whether or not the search history of that user was included in the published search log. With this guarantee a user does not regret having used the particular search engine for his or her queries. Dwork et al. turned this idea into a formal privacy definition called ǫ-differential privacy that we apply here to search logs: 
This definition ensures that a user has no reason to complain that the search engine published S, since S could have also arisen from a search log SL ′ that did not include the correct search history of the user. We will refer to search logs that only differ in the search history of a single user as neighboring search logs in the remainder of this paper.
A probabilistic version of differential privacy called (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy that relaxes ǫ-differential privacy has been proposed by Machanavajjhala et al.: 
Definition 2 allows A to be imperfect: With probability at most δ the output of A could breach the privacy of an individual. But if we choose δ to be small then with high probability the output of A offers the same privacy guarantee as ǫ-differential privacy.
Note that we also considered another relaxation of ǫ-differential privacy called (ǫ, δ)-indistinguishability [7] , which, intuitively, ensures that each user's privacy is secured with a probability of at least 1 − δ. Nevertheless, (ǫ, δ)-indistinguishability does not provide any guarantee on the probability that the privacy of all users is protected. As a consequence, the chance that a privacy breach occurs for at least one user can be significantly larger than δ. In contrast, (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy is provably strictly stronger: it ensures that, with at least 1 − δ probability, no privacy breach will occur for any user. History has shown, as in the case of Ms. Arnold, that breaching the privacy of a single user can be disastrous. Hence, we believe that the stronger notion of privacy is needed in practice.
The ZEALOUS Algorithm
This section presents ZEALOUS, a novel privacypreserving algorithm for publishing histograms from a search log. ZEALOUS is efficient despite the sparsity of the data and the huge (infinite) domain of these items. ZEALOUS can be used to publish histograms of keywords, queries, query pairs or clicks. For ease of presentation, we explain in the remainder of this section the instance of ZEALOUS that publishes keywords; other instantiations are straightforward, and we will evaluate these other instances of ZEALOUS experimentally in Sections 4 and 5.
One of the advantages of ZEALOUS is its simplicity: It uses a two-step process to eliminate the tail of the search log, i.e., the keywords with low counts, to achieve a strong privacy guarantee. We give the pseudocode of ZEALOUS next; Figure 1 gives a pictorial description of ZEALOUS. Sample a random number η k from the distribution Lap(λ) 3 and add it to the count, resulting in a noisy count:c k ← c k + η k . 3 The Laplace distribution with scale parameter λ has the probability density function 6. Publish the remaining keywords and their noisy counts.
The following theorem tells us how to set the parameters λ and τ ′ , given values for ǫ, δ, τ and m such that ZEALOUS guarantees (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy. 
and for any keyword histogram ω ∈ Ω and for any neighboring search log SL ′ of SL,
We will first prove that Equation (3) holds. Assume that the i-th
Next, we will show that Equation (4) also holds. Let SL ′ be any neighboring search log of SL. Let ω be any possible output of ZEALOUS given SL, such that ω ∈ Ω. To establish Equation (4) , it suffices to prove that
As the proofs for Equations (6) and (7) are similar, in the following we will focus on Equation (6) 
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In what follows, we will show that
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Now consider case (ii) when
Therefore,
Lastly, consider case (iii) when
In summary,
we have
by Equation 3 and |∆| ≤ 2m).
Therefore, the theorem is proved.
Map-Reduce Implementation
Given a search log grouped by user-ids, ZEALOUS runs in time linear in the size of the search log, and it has a modest space complexity. However, we expect that ZEALOUS will be applied to search logs with billions of search requests, which may be distributed across hundred of machines. To handle such a large search log, we easily parallelize ZEALOUS through a map-reduce [6] implementation. The parallel algorithm has two steps. In the first step we select at most m contributions per user through a MapReduce phase. In the second step, we generate the histogram, filter out items with counts below τ , add noise to the remaining counts, and output only items and their noisy count if it is above τ ′ ; this again can be easily done through a Map-Reduce phase. The pseudocode of the algorithm is as follows.
Input: user-id, (query, time, clicks)
o.w.
A Discussion of Alternatives
Now that we have seen ZEALOUS and its properties, we explain why we cannot simply apply prior work, and we also explain the rationale behind the various steps of ZEALOUS that address some of the true difficulties in publishing search logs while limiting disclosure of sensitive information.
Since we want to enforce differential privacy, we could first think about applying an existing algorithm to the search log. One existing algorithm for publishing histograms, developed by Dwork et al. [8] , adds noise sampled from a Laplacian distribution to every keyword that a user could have used to formulate a query. The amount of noise that we have to add depends on the sensitivity s of the histogram, where the sensitivity is the maximum L1 difference between the histograms of two neighboring search logs. However, if we do not bound the size of the history of any user, then a single user could potentially affect the count of every keyword (consider for example a user whose search history contains every word in the English language or even random strings), thus leading to a very large value of s. The corresponding amount of noise ( 2s ǫ ) would be so large that the output of this algorithm would retain no useful information in the output search log. Hence, we need to limit the number of keywords contributed by each user. Note that ZEALOUS implements exactly this restriction as Step 1.
After limiting the contributions per user we would still have to add noise to the count of every possible keyword that could have been used to formulate a query. For instance, even if we limit the size of keywords to at most 30 characters, the size of the domain of all possible keywords would be N = 26 30 ! We would need to add noise to each of these N keywords even if they do not exist in the search log and thus have a count of zero. It is clearly inefficient to add noise to such a huge number of counts (most of which are zeros anyway).
A tractable algorithm would only add noise to the keywords that actually occur in the search log, (or more generally to all counts above a threshold τ ). This version of the algorithm corresponds to steps 1. -4. of ZEALOUS. However, as stated in the following proposition, adding noise to only the keywords with count above some threshold guarantees neither ǫ-differential privacy nor (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy.
Proposition 1 Given a τ > 0, adding noise only to keywords with counts above τ guarantees neither
The proof can be found in Appendix A. In contrast to the above approach, ZEALOUS manages to achieve privacy by applying a second threshold τ ′ in Step 5. In summary, previous work on publishing histograms in a way that preserves ǫ-differential privacy cannot be efficiently applied to search logs because of the size of the domain. ZEALOUS handles the size of the domain gracefully: It focuses on publishing only frequent items and thus works independently of the size of the domain.
Choosing Parameters
Apart from the privacy parameters ǫ and δ, ZEAL-OUS requires the data publisher to specify two more parameters: τ , the first threshold used to eliminate keywords with low counts (Step 3), and m, the number of contributions per user. These parameters affect both the noise added to each count as well as the second threshold τ ′ . Before we discuss the choice of these parameters we explain the general set-up of our experiments.
Data. In our experiments we work with a search log of user queries from the Yahoo! search engine collected from 500,000 users over a period of one month. This search log contains about one million distinct keywords, three million distinct queries, three million distinct query pairs, and 4.5 million distinct clicks.
Privacy Parameters. In all experiments we set δ = 0.001. Thus the probability that the output of ZEALOUS could breach the privacy of a user is appropriately small. We explore different levels of differential privacy by varying ǫ.
Choosing Threshold τ
We would like to retain as much information as possible in the published search log. A smaller value for τ ′ immediately leads to a histogram with higher utility because fewer items and their noisy counts are filtered out in the last step of ZEALOUS. Thus if we choose τ in a way that minimizes τ ′ we maximize the utility of the resulting histogram. Interestingly, choosing τ = 1 does not necessarily minimize the value of τ ′ . Table 1 presents the value of τ ′ for different values of τ for m = 2 and ǫ = 1.
As we can see, for our parameter setting τ ′ is minimized if τ = 4. We can show the following strong optimality result which tells us how to choose τ optimally in order to maximize utility. The proof follows from taking the derivative of τ ′ as a function of τ (based on Equation (2)) to determine its minimum.
Choosing the Number of Contributions m
Proposition 2 tells us how to set τ in order to maximize utility. However, it is less clear how to set m optimally. To discuss our choice of m we will show the effect of varying m on the coverage and the precision of the sanitized histogram of items. The top-j coverage of a sanitized search log is defined as the fraction of distinct items among the top-j most frequent items in the original search log that also appear in the sanitized search log. The top-j precision of a sanitized search log is defined as the distance between the relative frequencies in the original search log versus the sanitized search log for the top-j most frequent items. In particular, we study two distance metrics between the relative frequencies: the average L-1 distance and the KL-divergence. As a first study of the coverage Table 2 shows the number of distinct items (recall that items can be keywords, queries, query pairs, or clicks) in the sanitized search log as m increases. We observe that cov- As a first approximation to measure how m affects precision, we look at the total sum of the counts in the sanitized histogram as we increase m in Table 4 . Higher total counts offer the possibility to match the original distribution at a finer grain. We observe that as we increase m, the total counts increase until a tipping point after which they start decreasing again. This effect is as expected for the following reason: As m increases, each user contributes more items, which leads to higher counts in the sanitized histogram. However, the total count increases only sub-linearly with m (and even decreases) due to the reduction in coverage we discussed above. We found that the tipping point where the total count starts to decrease seems to roughly correspond to the average number of items contributed by each user in the original search log (shown in Table 3 ). This suggests that one should never choose m to be larger than the average number of items, because it decreases both the coverage and the total count while at the same time increases the noise.
Let us take a closer look at precision and coverage of the histograms of the various domains in Figures 2  and 3 . In Figure 2 we vary m between 1 and 40. Each curve plots the precision or coverage of the sanitized search log at various values of the top-j parameter in comparison to the original search log. Based on the total number of distinct items in the original search log for the various domains we chose the values for the top-j parameter appropriately. The upper two rows plot precision curves for the average L-1 distance (first row) and the KL-divergence (second row) of the relative frequencies. The lower two rows plot the coverage curves, i.e. the total (relative, respectively) number of top-j items in the original search log that do not appear in sanitized search log in the third row (fourth row, respectively).
First, observe that the coverage decreases as m increases, which confirms our discussion about the number of distinct items. Moreover, we see that the coverage gets worse for increasing values of the top-j parameter. This illustrates that ZEALOUS gives better utility for the more frequent items. Second, note that for small values of the top-j parameter, values of m > 1 give better precision. However, when the top-j parameter is increased, m = 1 gives better precision because the precision of the top-j values degrades due to items no longer appearing in the sanitized search log due to the increased cutoffs. Figure 3 shows the same statistics varying the top-j parameter on the x-axis. Each curve plots the precision for m = 1, 2, 4, 8, 10, 40, respectively. Note that m = 1 does not always give the best precision; for keywords, m = 8 has the lowest KL-divergence, and for queries, m = 2 has the lowest KL-divergence.
As we can see from our evaluation of these results, there are two "regimes" for setting the value of m. If we are mainly interested in coverage, then m should be set to 1. However, if we are only interested in a few top-j items then we can increase precision by choosing a larger value for m, and we recommend the average number of items per user. We will see this dichotomy again in our real applications of search log analysis: The index caching application does not require high coverage because of its storage restriction. However, the precision of the top-j most frequent items is necessary to determine which of them to keep in memory. On the other hand, query substitutions are better with a larger number of distinct queries and query pairs because the number of substitution it generates depends on this coverage. Thus m should be set to a large value for index caching and to a small value for query substitution. 
Application-Oriented Evaluation
In this section, we experimentally evaluate ZEAL-OUS against a representative k-anonymity algorithm for publishing search logs. Traditionally, the utility of a privacy-preserving algorithm has been evaluated by comparing the input of the algorithm with the output to see "how much information is lost" by comparing some statistics of the sanitized output with the original data. The choice of suitable statistics is a difficult problem as these statistics need to mirror the sufficient statistics of applications that will use the sanitized search log. As notable differences, Brickell et al. [4] measure the utility with respect to data mining tasks and Kifer and Gehrke [11] develop specific techniques to boost utility with respect to log-linear models. In order to fully understand the performance of ZEALOUS in an application context, we picked two real applications from the information retrieval community to evaluate the utility of ZEALOUS: Index caching as a representative application for search performance, and query substitution as a representative application for search quality.
k-Query Anonymity. We will compare ZEALOUS against a representative k-anonymity algorithm for search logs called k-query anonymity [1] . We create a k-query anonymous search log as follows: We filter out all queries that are posed by fewer than k distinct users. We then compute histograms of keywords, queries, and query pairs from the k-queryanonymous search log. 4 We would like to emphasize that it is the goal of our comparison just to get a ballpark understanding how much utility we lose in comparison to an approach based on k-anonymity. We will show using Examples 1 and 6 in Section 6 that the privacy guarantees provided by k-anonymitybased approaches are much weaker compared to our approach. In our comparison we seek to answer the question: What is the price in utility that we have to pay for a strong privacy guarantee? We first describe our utility evaluation with statistics in Section 5.1 and then with real applications in Sections 5.2 and 5.3.
General Statistics
We explore different statistics that measure the difference of sanitized histograms to the histograms computed using the original search log. We analyze the histograms of keywords, queries, and query pairs for both sanitization methods. For clicks we only consider ZEALOUS histograms since a k-query anonymous search log does not contain any click data.
In our first experiment we compare the distribution of the counts in the histograms. Note that a k-query anonymous search log will never have query and keyword counts below k, and similarly a ZEALOUS histogram will never have counts below τ ′ . We choose ǫ = 5, m = 1 for which threshold τ ′ ≈ 10. Therefore we deliberately set k = 10 such that k ≈ τ ′ for a comparable setting. Figure 4 shows the distribution of the counts in the histograms on a log-log scale. We see that the powerlaw shape of the distribution is well preserved. However, the total frequencies are lower for the sanitized search logs than the frequencies in the original histogram because our sanitization methods filter out user contributions. We also see the cutoffs created by k and τ ′ . One interesting observation is that as the domain increases from keywords to clicks and query pairs, the number of infrequent items becomes larger for the original search log. For example, the number of clicks with count one is an order of magnitude larger than the number of keywords with count one despite the fact that there are more keywords in the version of the paper if the code ever becomes available.
search log than clicks.
While it is good to know that the shape of the count distribution is well preserved, we would also like to know whether the counts of frequent keywords, queries, query pairs, and clicks are also preserved and what impact the privacy parameters ǫ and the anonymity parameter k have. Figure 5 shows the average differences to the counts in the original histogram. More precisely, we scaled up the sanitized histograms such that the total counts were equal to the total counts of the original histogram, then we calculated the average difference between the counts. The average is taken over all keywords that have non-zero count in the original search log. As such this metric takes both coverage and precision into account.
As expected, with increasing ǫ the average difference decreases, since the noise added to to each count decreases. Similarly, by decreasing k the accuracy increases, because more queries will pass the threshold. Figure 5 shows that the average difference is comparable for the k anonymous histogram and our ZEALOUS histogram. For keywords we observe that the ZEALOUS histogram is more accurate than a k anonymous histogram for all values of ǫ > 2. For queries we obtain roughly the same average difference for k = 60 and ǫ = 6. For query pairs the k-query anonymous histogram provides better utility.
We also computed other metrics such as the rootmean-square value of the differences and the total variation difference; they all reveal similar qualitative trends. Thus despite the fact that ZEALOUS disregards many search log records (by throwing out all but m contributions per user and by throwing out low frequent counts), ZEALOUS is able to preserve the overall distribution well.
Index Caching
Search engines maintain an inverted index which, in its simplest instantiation, contains for each keyword a posting list of identifiers of the documents in which the keyword appears. This index can be used to answer search queries, but also to classify queries for choosing sponsored search results. While the index is often too large to fit in memory, maintaining a part of it in memory reduces response time for all these applications. In the index caching problem, we aim to store in memory a set S of posting lists that maximizes the hit-probability over all keywords (the formulation of the problem is from Baeza-Yates [2] ). Given such a set S and a probability distribution over the likelihood of occurrence of keywords in a query, the hit-probability is the sum of the likelihoods of the keywords whose posting list are kept in memory.
In our experiments, we use an improved version of the algorithm developed by Baeza-Yates [2] to decide which posting lists should be kept in memory. This algorithm first assigns each keyword a score, which equals its frequency in the search log divided by the number of documents that contain the keyword. Keywords are chosen using a greedy bin-packing strategy where we sequentially add posting lists from the keywords with the highest score until the memory is filled. In our experiments we fixed the memory size to be 1GB, and each document posting to be 8 Bytes (other parameters give comparable results). Our inverted index stores the document posting list for each keyword sorted according to their relevance which allows to retrieve the documents in the order of their relevance. We truncate this list in memory to contain at most 200,000 documents. Hence, for an incoming query the search engine retrieves the posting list for each keyword in the query either from memory or from disk. If the intersection of the posting lists happens to be empty, then less relevant documents are retrieved from disk for those keywords for which only the truncated posting list is kept on memory. Figure 6 shows the hit-probabilities of the inverted index constructed using the original search log, the k-anonymous search log, and the ZEALOUS histogram with our greedy approximation algorithm. log for a range of parameters. We note that the utility only suffers marginally when increasing the privacy parameter or the anonymity parameter (at least in the range that we have considered).
As a last experiment we study the effect of varying m on the hit-probability in Figure 6 (b). We observe that the hit probability for m = 6 is above 0.36 whereas the hit probability for m = 1 is less than 0.33. This confirms our findings about setting the value m from Figure 2 : For this application, the sanitized data should accurately model the relative frequencies of the most frequent keywords in the original search log, and thus a larger value of m gives more accurate estimates of the hit-probability.
Query Substitution
Query Substitution studies how to rephrase a user query to match it to documents or advertisements that do not contain the actual keywords of the query but contain relevant information. Query substitution has applications in query refinement, sponsored search, and spelling error correction, just to name a few. Algorithms for query substitution examine query pairs to learn how users re-phrase queries. In the algorithm by Jones et al. [10] , related queries for a query are identified in two steps. First, the query is partitioned into subsets of keywords, called phrases, based on their mutual information. Next, for each phrase, candidate query substitutions are determined based on the distribution of queries.
We run this algorithm to generate ranked substitution on the sanitized search logs. We then compare these rankings with the rankings produced by the original search log which serve as ground truth.
To measure the quality of the query substitutions, we compute the precision/recall, MAP (mean average precision) and NDG (normalized discounted cumulative gain) of the top-j suggestions for each query; let us define these metrics next.
Consider a query q and its list of top-j ranked substitutions q ′ 0 , . . . , q ′ j−1 computed based on a sanitized search log. We compare this ranking against the topj ranked substitutions q 0 , . . . , q j−1 computed based on the original search log as follows. The precision is the fraction of substitutions from the sanitized search log that are also contained in our ground truth ranking:
Note, that the number of items in the ranking for a query q can be less than j. The recall is the fraction of substitutions in our ground truth that are contained in the substitutions from the sanitized search log:
Recall(q) = |{q 0 , . . . , q j−1 } ∩ {q . Moreover, it takes the length of the actual lists into consideration. We refer the reader to the paper by Chakrabarti et al. [5] for details on NDCG.
The discussed metrics compare rankings for one query. To compare the utility of our algorithms, we average over all queries. For coverage we average over all queries for which the original search log produces substitutions. For all other metrics that try to capture the precision of a ranking, we average only over the queries for which the sanitized search logs produce substitutions. We generated query substitution only for the 100,000 most frequent queries of the original search log since the substitution algorithm only works well given enough information about a query. In Figure 7 we vary k and ǫ for m = 1 and we draw the utility curves for top-j for j = 2 and j = 5. We observe that varying ǫ and k has hardly any influence on the performance. On all precision measures, ZEALOUS provides utility comparable to kquery-anonymity. However, the coverage provided by ZEALOUS is not good. This is because the computation of query substitutions relies not only on the frequent query pairs but also on the count of phrase pairs which record for two sets of keywords how often a query containing the first set was followed by another query containing the second set. Thus a phrase pair can have a high frequency even though all query pairs it is contained in have very low frequency. ZEALOUS filters out these low frequency query pairs and thus loses many frequent phrase pairs.
As a last experiment, we study the effect of increasing m for query substitutions. Figure 8 plots the average coverage of the top-2 and top-5 substitutions produced by ZEALOUS for m = 1 and m = 6 for various values of ǫ. It is clear that across the board larger values of m lead to smaller coverage, thus confirming our intuition in the previous section.
Related Work
The main focus of previous work on publishing search logs [1, 16, 19, 17] were different variants of kanonymity [18] . Anonymity prevents re-identification of a user's data in the published data; for search logs it means that the search history of every individual is indistinguishable from the history of k − 1 other individuals.
Let us first discuss algorithms that have been suggested to achieve different types of of k-anonymity in search logs. Adar proposes the following algorithm: Given a search log partitioned into sessions, all queries are discarded that are associated with fewer than k different user-ids. In each session the user-id is substituted by a random number [1] . We call the output a k-query anonymous search log. Motwani and Nabar substitute in each session the user-id by a random number and then add or delete Keywords from sessions until each session contains the same keywords as at least k − 1 other sessions in the search log [16] . We call the output a k-session anonymous search log.
However, k-anonymity is insufficient for search logs since it does not prevent an attacker from learning sensitive information. We illustrate this through the following homogeneity attack [14] against a k-query anonymous search log. Similarly, a homogeneity attack against a k-session anonymous search log can be constructed. Moreover, k-query anonymity (even the stronger notion of k-session anonymity) do not guarantee that it is impossible for an attacker to link a search entry to its data-owner. Although k-query anonymity and k-session anonymity aim to achieve variants of k-anonymity, they fail to do so against active attacks as illustrated below. This very simple and effective attack can be applied to a k-query-anonymous or k-session-anonymous search log. The attack shows that variations of kanonymity do not actually prevent an attacker from linking sensitive information to an individual.
Apart from the algorithms that have been suggested for search logs there are more algorithms achieving variants of k-anonymity that could be applied to search logs.
Multi-relational kanonymity [17] can be applied as a complement to k-query anonymity to publish clicks of a search log by encoding them as set-valued attributes. FreeForm-anonymity [19] can be used to strengthen k-anonymity by considering more attributes as sensitive (not just the user-id). However, all these extensions are still vulnerable to the active attack which can be successfully carried out on the output of any anonymization algorithm that tries to achieve indistinguishability on the user-id level instead of the individual level.
Note that none of these attacks can be applied to a (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differentially private search log. Even an attacker with multiple accounts learns roughly the same about a user whether or not the search history of that user was included in the published search log with high probability. Independent of our work Korolova et al. [12] developed a privacy-preserving algorithm for publishing queries and clicks. 5 
Conclusions
In this paper we developed a novel algorithm called ZEALOUS that allows us to publish frequent keywords, queries, consecutive query pairs, and clicks. For many applications, infrequent items are of no interest, and thus our algorithm can provide good utility: The relative counts of the frequent items are preserved well as shown by our experiments.
However, there are applications for which the infrequent items matter. One such example is query clustering [20] , where the similarity measure of the clustering algorithm takes into account the implicit feedback given by user clicks. The actual count of a click does not matter to this clustering algorithm; it only matters whether or not the count is above zero. Since ZEALOUS only preserves the frequent clicks, ZEALOUS results in bad utility for this algorithm. Publishing information about infrequent items of a search log in a privacy-preserving manner remains a topic of future research. 
A Proof of Proposition 1
Let A denote the algorithm that adds noise to frequent keywords only. Let SL be a search log containing search entries of U users, and and SL ′ be a neighboring search log of SL. Let H (H ′ ) be the keyword histogram constructed from SL (SL ′ ) by selecting m distinct keywords from each users. Without loss of generality, assume that (i) H contains exactly U · m/τ keywords whose counts equal τ , and (ii) any keyword in H has a count τ − 1 in H ′ . Observe that, given SL ′ , A always returns a histogram where none of the keywords in H appears. On the other hand, given SL, with a non-zero probability A will return a histogram that contains some keywords in H. This clearly violates ǫ-differential privacy.
Let Ω be the set of histograms that have zero counts for all keywords in H. 
This indicates that Pr[A(SL)
∈ Ω] ≥ 1 − δ does not hold for any δ < 1/2, completing our proof.
